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This paper, Patterns and Determinants of Anti-dumping: A Worldwide Perspective’ is part 
of the research programme on the WTO-related issues, funded by the Sir Ratan Tata Trust. 
It takes a critical look at the trends in worldwide anti-dumping case filings and measures 
taken during the last two decades. The author also examines how macro economic factors  
influence the use of anti-dumping in developed and developing countries. The analysis  
reinforces the view that the primary jurisdiction for the anti-dumping law is really more 
political  than economic. It is observed that as tariff rates are reduced further, the use of 
anti-dumping will spread among developing countries not only due to greater liberalisation 
pressures but also due to the fact that more and more countries would like to create anti-
dumping ability to counter anti-dumping use against them. This may reverse the trade 
gains that liberalisation may ensure to them. This study argues that further fine-tuning and 
refining of the anti-dumping policy is not the answer to prevent its (mis)use. It calls for 
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I.  Background  
 
GATT 1947 envisaged an elaborate plan for trade liberalisation. While its negotiators recognised 
the gains from free trade, they were also cognizant that openness might make economies 
vulnerable to injury due to adverse trade shocks and that any government that maintained an 
open trade regime must have at hand some sort of pressure valve to manage occasional pressures 
for exceptional or sectoral protection.  For that reason, they provided a number of provisions for 
contingent protection within the GATT,  which permitted the signatories under specified 
circumstances to withdraw their n ormal obligations.  The three most important contingent 
protection measures  were - anti dumping, safeguard and countervailing duties
1. However these 
measures were used rarely until recently. The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade negotiations 
concluded on 15
th April 1995 in Marrakesh provided elaboration on the basic principles to 
govern the determination and application of the three main contingent measures. Since then, 
contingent protection has evolved into a global phenomenon with an increasing number of 
countries adopting contingent protection laws and making use of them. The bulk of contingent 
protection however falls on the instrument of anti-dumping. Between 1995 and 2000, the number 
of anti-dumping cases initiated accounted for 89.1 per cent of the total of the three main 
contingent measures used (Table 1). The share of CVD remained as small as 7.1 per cent.  
Safeguard have been the least frequently used measures with their share being only 3.8 per cent 
over this period. 
                                                                 
* The author would like to thank Professors Arvind Virmani and B.N.Goldar for their valuable comments 
on an earlier draft of the paper. The paper was presented in a seminar organised by ICRIER. Comments of 
participants are gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining faults are the sole responsibility of the author. 
 
1 S ee, Hoda 1987 for a detailed analysis of GATT 1947 provisions  and developments in subsequent 
rounds.   2 
 
Table 1 : Initiations of contingent protection measures 
  CVD  Anti-dumping  Safeguard 
1995  10  156  2 
1996  7  221  5 
1997  16  242  3 
1998  26  232  10 
1999  40  339  15 
2000  16  251  26 





                                              Source : Rowe and Maw (April 2001) 
Anti-dumping has now become an important trade policy tool for developed and developing 
countries, both. Only a decade ago developing countries had a negligible share in anti-dumping 
cases. They were involved in anti-dumping only to the extent that they were on the receiving 
end. By the end of the 1990s these countries themselves became active users of anti-dumping 
and now they initiate almost half of the total number of anti-dumping cases. This surge of anti-
dumping activities raises a number of questions. Is the number of  anti-dumping cases rising 
alarmingly? Is the use of  anti-dumping widespread among developing countries? Are they 
reporting more cases than those directed against them? Can they defend the cases they report as 
successfully as developed countries? Are their investigations directed towards developed 
countries? What is the primary concern of countries while using this mechanism ? Is this 
mechanism in reality used as a trade correcting measure? Do developing and developed countries 
have different m otivations for adopting these measures? The present paper  aims at addressing 
some of these questions. While doing that, it broadly classifies these questions into two sets. 
While one set of questions relates to the trends and patterns of anti-dumping use, the other set of 
questions pertains to the motivation of anti-dumping initiations. Thus, the objectives of the paper 
are twofold. First, it investigates the trends and patterns of the use of anti-dumping in developed 
and developing economies for a period  of over 20 years from 1980 to 2000.  Second, it 
investigates the factors that motivate  anti-dumping initiations. The modern theory of anti-
dumping termed ‘political economy approach’ provides the theoretical underpinning for the 
analysis of the factors that motivate  anti-dumping initiations. This approach implicates that 
domestic firms use anti-dumping in order to become a strategic shelter from foreign competitors.  
While using this approach most studies (Finger 1981, Herander and Schwartz 1984, Feinberg   3 
and Hirsch 1989, Hansen 1990, Krupp 1994) Leichenberg and Tan 1994, Sabry 2000, Prusa and 
Skeath 2002) have focussed on the role of industry specific factors in motivating anti-dumping 
initiations. The present study however investigates whether anti-dumping actions may be related 
to macroeconomic conditions. Though there have been a few attempts to analyse the role of 
macroeconomic conditions in motivating  anti-dumping initiations, these are directed to the 
developed countries and are either narrowly focussed or have inadequate data coverage (Leidy 
1997 and Feinberg 1989 for the US, Becker and Theuringer 2001 for the EU, Knetter and Prusa 
2003 for four developed countries- US, Canada, Australia and EU). For instance, Feinberg 
(1989) concentrated on the effect of exchange rate movement on US anti-dumping filings across 
four import source countries : Brazil, Korea, Japan and Mexico for 24 quarters from 1982 
through 1987. In doing so, he employed a single-variable model. Knetter and Prusa (2003) also 
focussed on the relationship between  exchange change variations and anti-dumping filings. 
They used an extended model which had, apart from exchange rate, real GDP also as an 
explanatory variable. They ignored other macroeconomic factors. Analyses of Leidy (1997) for 
the US and Becker and Theuringer (2001) for the EU are constrained to short time series which 
weakened the creditability of their results. The present study examines the macroeconomic 
determinants of anti-dumping filings in developed and developing countries in a comparative 
framework. It draws on the existing literature to identify a number of possible motives of the 
users of anti-dumping and empirically examines, using a panel data set of 99 countries
2 over the 
period 1980-2000, which of the motives receives support in the data. 
 
The paper begins by examining the genesis and evolution of the anti-dumping mechanism in 
Section II. Section III then carries out an in depth analysis of the trends and patterns of anti-
dumping initiations and targets. Section IV provides an empirical analysis of the macroeconomic 






                                                                 
2 These countries include all reporting and targeted countries.   4 
 
II.   Genesis and Evolution of Anti-dumping 
 
Anti-dumping rules started to develop in the early part of the 20
th century with the adoption of 
legislation by firstly Canada in 1904, and subsequently New Zealand (1905), Australia (1906) 
and the United States (1916). For the first anti-dumping law, passed in Canada in 1904, the real 
impetus was Canadian manufacturing's concern about low import prices. Its primary objective 
was to protect Canadian firms from steel dumped in Canada by the US firms. In the United 
States, however, the 1916 Anti-dumping Act was narrowly aimed at predatory pricing by foreign 
exporters (Hufbauer 1999). It was a criminal statute that was born out of fear that after the end of 
WWI European-especially German, firms would try to regain their position on the US markets 
through predatory pricing ( see for instance, Almstedt 1981). It required the complainant to prove 
that the foreign supplier resorted to predatory dumping. In 1921, the US adopted an amended 
Act, which closely resembled Canada's anti-dumping law. It was a civil statute to assess penalty 
duties to compensate for price differentials. In the same year, the UK also adopted its first anti-
dumping legislation whilst Canada, New Zealand and Australia substantially amended their acts. 
These developments, notwithstanding, anti-dumping remained a relatively infrequently used 
instrument.  In the immediate post-war period only South Africa, Canada and Australia were 
using anti-dumping as an important trade instrument.  
 
The anti-dumping law was not regulated under international law until the adoption of GATT 
1947. GATT 1947 incorporated the basic conditions for adopting anti-dumping measures with 
the insistence of the US. Following GATT 1947, discussions concerning the development of 
comprehensive anti-dumping rules continued with GATT Working Parties in the 1950s and 
1960s . However, there was no significant development on this issue and it remained a minor 
trade instrument. anti-dumping disputes were relatively few and far between until 1980. In GATT’s 
early years, renegotiations and emergency actions (restrict first and then negotiate compensation) 
were the principle mechanisms for making adjustments (Finger et al. 2001). During GATT’s first 
15 years (1947-1962), countries opening their economies to international competition availed of  
such measures in large proportion. In the 1950s, more elaborate renegotiation provisions were 
added to the GATT. By 1963, 110  renegotiations had been undertaken. These amounted to 
almost four per member country. The use of renegotiations began to wane from 1963 onwards.   5 
These were replaced by Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs). VERs were bilateral negotiations 
outside GATT’ auspices through which exporting countries were persuaded to restrain exports 
voluntarily. Though VERs were GATT-illegal, they were consistent with the principles of 
reciprocity. They were  based on negotiations between trading partners. These negotiations 
prevented chain reaction. Besides, VERs provided compensation, the compensation being the 
higher price/ ensured market  that the exporters would get. The Long Term Cotton Textile 
Arrangement negotiated in 1962 brought GATT sanction to industrial economies’ VERs on 
cotton textiles and apparels. The Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) negotiated in 1972 extended 
the GATT sanction for such restrictions to virtually all textiles and clothing products. The 
industrial countries used VERs in several other sectors like steel, footwear, motor vehicle and 
electronic products. The use of anti-dumping measures had been limited during this period. 
There is no exact accounting of worldwide anti-dumping activity for this period  because before 
1980, the GATT did not require countries to report when they initiated contingent protection 
actions. However, some estimates on the number of  anti-dumping actions do exist.   Finger 
(1993) for instance,  observed that in 1958, when the GATT countries first analysed the number 
of cases, 37 anti-dumping measures were in force (excluding Canada and New Zealand from 
whom no figures were  collected) of which 21 were adopted by South Africa. Hufbauer (1999) 
found that between 1954 and 1974, fewer than 100 cases were brought in the US and most were 
dismissed. Schott (1994) noted that in the 1960s all GATT members led only about ten anti-
dumping petitions per year.  
 
In the Kennedy Round (1963-67) regulation of anti-dumping rules was taken up in earnest and 
an international code on anti-dumping procedures was adopted. This entered into force in 1968 
and was named ‘ Agreement on the implementation of Article VI of GATT’ or in short ‘Anti-
dumping Agreement’. This formed the basis for the first European Community anti-dumping 
legislation adopted in 1968. However, the  use of anti-dumping remained very limited among the 
contracting parties. Almost all anti-dumping activity was confined to six major users – the US, 
the EU, Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand with 24-36 cases filed per year for all 
these users combined. The Kennedy Round was followed by the Tokyo Round Code (1973-78) 
which entered in to force in 1980  and set out detailed procedural requirements that must be 
fulfilled in the conduct of investigations (See Krishna 1997 for details). The use of anti-dumping   6 
activity increased dramatically in the post Tokyo Round Period of the 1980s. Around 1600 cases 
were filed worldwide during the 1980s which was double the filing rate of the 1970s. However 
anti-dumping activities in this period were driven mainly by developed countries.  This was 
because only 27 countries – mostly developed countries signed the Tokyo Round and were 
bound by its requirements. Developing countries did not  subscribe to it. By the early 1990s, 
however, some of the developing countries also started participating in this activity. The 
Uruguay Round (GATT 1994) that followed the Tokyo Round and came into force in 1995, 
more precisely defined the rules and procedures of anti-dumping measures. The new Agreement 
introduced more detailed procedures for initiating and conducting anti-dumping investigations 
and reduced discretion with respect to methods used to determine dumping and injury margins, 
sun set clause, and particular standards for dispute Settlement Panels to apply in anti-dumping 
disputes. The revised Agreement provides for greater clarity and more detailed rules in relation 
to the method of determining that a product is dumped, the criteria to be taken into account in a 
determination that dumped imports cause injury to a domestic industry, the procedures to be 
followed in initiating and conducting investigations and the implementation and duration of anti-
dumping measures. It was expected that  higher standards of initiations of  anti-dumping cases 
would restrain its use by member countries by making it more difficult to file complaints and to 
prove dumping and injury, and by strengthening the dispute settlement system (See Krishna 
1997, Roitinger 2002). However, contrary to the expectation, there was a  dramatic increase in 
the use of  anti-dumping activity by developing countries in the post Uruguay Round.  anti-
dumping has now evolved into a global phenomenon with an increasing number of developing 
countries adopting these laws and making use of them. Total number of 2675 cases were initiated 
in the 1990s. Of these, 1335 cases were filed in the post WTO period of the late 1990s. Almost 
all WTO member countries have now adopted/amended their anti-dumping legislation. Some of 
the countries that are not members of WTO (such as Russia)  have also acquired their anti-
dumping legislation. What follows is an attempt to analyse the trends and patterns of the 
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III.   Trends and Patterns of Anti-dumping Use 
 
While analysing the trends and patterns of worldwide anti-dumping use, the paper uses a detailed 
data set provided by the rules division of WTO
3. From the beginning of 1980 the Anti-dumping 
Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) required its signatories to submit 
reports of their anti-dumping activity to the GATT Committee on Anti-dumping Practices every 
six months. As a result, the Rules Division of the WTO has created a detailed database on anti-
dumping cases. This database is multidimensional. It provides information on anti-dumping 
activity of WTO members by initiating country, targeted country, targeted vs initiating country, 
sector and year. Although there are various errors, omissions and inconsistencies in the reports, 
WTO database remains the best source of international data available  on anti-dumping activity. 
The present study makes use of this database for analysing broad trends in anti-dumping actions. 
Using the classification adopted from the World Bank (2000), it classifies initiating and targeted 
developing  countries by level of development; i.e. whether such countries are low income 
countries, lower middle income countries, upper middle income countries. Developed countries 
are categorised as OECD or non-OECD high income countries. In all, the paper identifies five 
categories of countries : low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, OECD and 
non-OECD developed countries (Appendix Table A2). The paper analyses the patterns of anti-
dumping use across these different categories of countries. The sector disaggregation in the 
database follows the HS Classification of trade and is provided at the 2 digit level. We thus had 
data of anti-dumping initiations for 21 sectors. We rearranged this data into 4 broad categories – 
resource intensive sectors, labour intensive sectors, science based and miscellaneous sectors. 
Science based sector was further reclassified into differentiated and scale intensive sectors. 
While doing so we broadly followed the World Bank sectoral classification (Appendix Table 
A3) 
 
This section is organised into 4 subsections. Section III.1  documents the  trends and patterns of 
anti-dumping initiations by country group, country and time period. Section III.2 analyses the 
patterns of targeted countries. Section III.3 reveals who targets whom. Finally section III.4  
                                                                 
3 We thank Dr. Raul Torres for providing us the desired information from this database.   8 
provides an analysis of anti-dumping activity by sector both globally and within each initiating 
and targeted country group. 
 
III.1   Initiations 
 
The extent of anti-dumping activity may be gauged from the number of worldwide anti-dumping 
initiations. Fig. 1  shows the trends of worldwide anti-dumping actions over the past two 
decades. Since the  number of anti-dumping initiations is characterized by wide yearly  
 
Fig. 1 : Initiations by country group: 3-yearly moving average (1980-2000) 
 
fluctuations, we plotted 3 -yearly  moving averages. Two observations may be made.  First, 
during the 1990s the use of anti-dumping activity increased significantly over the late 1980s’.  A 
total number of 668 cases were reported in the late 1980s. In the early 1990s however, the 
number of anti-dumping initiations shot up to 1240. Following years witnessed further growth in 
anti-dumping investigations. During 1996-2000, the total number of anti-dumping cases reported 
was 1335. Second, before the Uruguay Round went into effect developed countries were more 
significant users of this law; since this agreement  went into effect in 1995, developing countries 
have been using the law more aggressively than their developed country counterparts. Thus, the 
use of  anti-dumping activity that was confined only to developed countries spread across 
different country groups during the  late 1990s.  
 
Table 2 provides summary information on anti-dumping initiations between 1980 and 2000 





















Total  9 
summary information in four time periods of 5-years each to avoid the problem of year to year 
fluctuations that characterise anti-dumping investigations. The table shows that 
 
 
Table 2 : Anti-dumping initiations by country group : Number of cases   
(1980 to 2000) 
 
  Number of cases 
Year  1980-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-00 
Developing Countries 
Low      0 
   
  0 
 
     21 
(1.7) 
   209 
(15.6) 
Middle      0 
 
  0 
 
     66 
(5.3) 
   213 
(15.9) 




     369   
(29.7) 
   345 
(25.8) 
Developed countries 
OECD      930 
(100.0) 




   550 
(41.2) 








Total    930 
(100.0) 
   668 
(100.0) 
    1240 
(100.0) 
  1335 
(100.0) 
          Note : Parentheses show the percentage of total cases 
                
   Source : Author’s computations based on WTO Secretariat Rules division database 
 
till 1984, all cases were  initiated by OECD countries; developing countries did not participate in 
this activity. During the late 1980s, upper income developing countries also started 
initiating/filing anti-dumping cases but their share remained mere 9%. In the early 1990s, there 
was a sharp increase  in cases opened by these countries and their share in total cases initiated 
increased to around 30%. A cyclical downturn was observed around that time in the world prices 
of many commodities. It appears that it induced new users, upper middle income countries in 
particular, to use the instrument of anti-dumping to protect their industries (see, Miranda et al. 
1998). The late 1990s witnessed a sharp increase in anti-dumping initiations by low and lower 
middle income developing countries also. The number of  anti-dumping initiations for low 
income countries over 1996-2000 was  10 times that of what it was in the early 1990s.  The cases 
reported by OECD and upper middle income countries declined marginally during this period; 
but increase in the cases in low and lower middle income countries more than compensated the 
decline. Thus, developing countries of all stages of development and industrialisation joined the 
ranks of active anti-dumping users by the late 1990s and fuelled the surge in anti-dumping cases.   10 
They together accounted for 57% of the total cases.  In the pre-WTO regime, GATT 
specifications of trade restrictions were of limited relevance to developing countries. Many 
developing countries had bound only a few of their tariffs; hence they could increase these tariffs 
without violating the GATT obligations. However, under WTO, all parts of agreements are 
applied to all member countries. Developing countries all submitted the schedules of bound tariff 
rates. It could be that  these countries started using anti-dumping in order to avoid some of the 
adverse effects of liberalisation and in order to reassure domestic political interests that some 
form of ‘safety net’ remains in place. Anti-dumping is thus no longer a law that is used by the 
developed country group alone. 
              
Patterns of  anti-dumping use changed significantly even within the group of developing 
countries. Fig 2  shows that prior to the Uruguay round, among developing countries, upper 
middle income  countries were the heaviest users of this law. In the Post Uruguay Round period  
however, the  
 
Fig 2: Anti-dumping Initiations by developing country group  : 3 years’ moving average 
(1980-00) 
 
numbers dropped for them. In contrast, the number of cases opened by low and lower middle 
income countries continued to rise reducing the gap in anti-dumping filings across different 
developing country groups.  
 
Analysis of country wise initiations suggests that anti-dumping cases till 1985 were initiated by 



















upper middle  11 
countries. In the late 1980s, Mexico – an upper income county joined the anti-dumping club as a 
major user of such actions. Other Latin American countries- Argentina, Brazil, C olumbia 
followed Mexico in the early 1990s. By the late 1990s, lower middle income countries- South 
Africa, Egypt, Peru, Philippines and low income countries - India, Indonesia also started using 
anti-dumping in a major way. While in 1980 only 4 countries reported anti-dumping initiations, 
in 1990 the number increased to 10. By 2000, 32 countries were reporting anti-dumping cases. 
Of these, 12 countries were upper income countries, 9 belonged to the middle income group, 5 
were OECD and 3 each were low income and non-OECD developed countries. However the 
distribution of anti-dumping user countries has been 
 
Table 3 : Top eleven anti-dumping users : 1996-2000 
Country  % share in total cases  Rank in anti-
dumping use 
% share within the country group 
OECD  
EU   14.0  1  34.0 
US  12.5  2  30.0 
Australia  8.0  5  20.0 
Canada  5.0  7  12.0 
Newzealand  2.0  11  4.0 
Upper middle  
Argentina   8.0  6  31 
Brazil  5.5  8  21 
Mexico  3.0  9  12 
Korea  2.7  10  11 
Lower middle  
South Africa  10.0  4  62 
Low income 
India  12.5  3  81 
 
Source : Author’s computations based on WTO Secretariat Rules division database  
 
highly concentrated. Only 11 countries  have been using anti-dumping actions actively (Table 3). 
These countries accounted for 80% of the total cases initiated during 1996-2000. Of these only 5 
countries –India, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa, belong to the developing country 
group. 
   12 
The above analysis indicates that the surge in anti-dumping cases was indeed fuelled by the 
developing countries in the late 1990s but the use of anti-dumping mechanism was still not 
widespread among these countries. There is not, as yet, an explosion in the number of developing 
countries using the anti-dumping law. This however does not undermine the problem for two 
reasons. One,  the adoption of anti-dumping mechanism by low and middle income countries 
suggests that it is the game that any country can play. Some believed that the fact that developing 
countries have shortage of skilled manpower, legal and administrative machinery would deter 
low income countries from opening such cases. However that does not seem to be the case. India 
had fewer than ten officials working on cases in their respective anti-dumping units in 1998 as 
compared to a figure of around 200 in the EU anti-dumping services. This however did not 
prevent India from becoming an increasingly significant user of anti-dumping. Two, trends of 
anti-dumping use suggest that once anti-dumping has been adopted by a country, it becomes 
difficult  for it to reign in its use. Restraining its use would require bold initiatives that aim at 
changing the basic framework of the anti-dumping mechanism at the WTO level.  
 
Success rates of anti-dumping initiations : by country-group 
 
Table 4 presents success rates of anti-dumping initiations over the period 1980 to 2000  broken 
down by  country group and time period. ‘Success rate’ of anti-dumping initiations is calculated 
as the ratio of definitive measures to  initiations with one year lag. It represents the probability 
that an initiation ends in definite measure. Definite measures include anti-dumping duty and 
price undertakings both. Normally there is one year lag between initiation of an anti-dumping 
investigation and definite measure taken. For that reason,  one year lag adjustment between 
initiations and measures was considered necessary. One would expect the success rate of anti-
dumping initiations to be lower in developing countries. This is because conducting a full anti-
dumping investigation requires, from the point of view of the investigating authorities, the 
commitment of much time, resources and labour. For developing countries in particular this may 
not be available. Our analysis also shows that the success rates for low and lower middle income 
countries are lower than those for upper middle and OECD countries. However, one may observe 
that the difference in success rates across different country groups is not very large. One must 
also observe that during the late 1990s,  anti-dumping initiation success rates increased 
dramatically across all country    13 
 
Table 4 : Success rates by country-group (1980 to 2000) 
(%) 
 1981-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-00 
Low  0  0  67  55 
Middle  0  0  32  59 
Upper  0  44  43  63 
OECD  53  49  48  61 
Non -OECD  0  0  30  61 
Total  53  48  46  60 
                       Source : Author’s computations based on WTO Secretariat Rules division database  
 
 
groups (except the low income country group). Several ambiguities in the legal provisions such 
as a number of allowable adjustments with limited interpretation; the use of constructed normal 
and export values, unrealistic adjustments use of surrogate country methodology for non-market 
economies, asymmetrical comparisons between the export and normal values introduce bias in 
favour of finding positive dumping margins. Determination of injury margin is subject to even 
more severe ambiguities and is highly discretionary. The administrative procedure is considered 
highly confidential increasing the risk of its misuse. It is quite at the discretion of the authorities 
to prove that dumping has occurred and that it has caused injury.  It is therefore not surprising 
that the success rate shows small variation across different country groups and that it has 
increased dramatically in the Post Uruguay Round when  countries across  all groups  are 
insisting on providing anti-dumping protection to their industries. 
 
III.2   Targets 
 
Fig 3  shows 3-yearly  moving averages of anti-dumping cases broken down by targeted country 
group. Whilst the numbers of anti-dumping cases targeted against developed countries remained 








Fig 3: Anti-dumping cases by targeted country group  : 3 years’ moving average 
 
 
the late 1990s, more cases were targeted against developing countries than against developed 
countries. During 1996-2000 developed countries were targeted in 36% of the cases while 64% 
cases were opened against developing countries. 
 
Among developing countries (Fig 4), the number of cases targeted against the l ow and middle 
income country groups followed a strong upward movement. However, the increase in the 
number of cases against the upper income country group was not so dramatic and was marked by 
wide fluctuations. 
 

























































































































upper  15 
Table 5 provides summary information on anti-dumping actions broken down by targeted 
country group. It shows that in the early 1980s, around 60% of the anti-dumping cases were 
against OECD countries. Nearly 22% cases were reported against the upper middle income 
group of developing countries. Low and lower middle income country-groups together 
constituted around 12% of the cases. In the late 1980s, these patterns remained the same. In the 
early 1990s, however, there was a quantum jump in the number of cases targeted against low- 
and lower middle-income countries. While in the late 1980s, only 17.5% of the cases were 
directed against them, in the early 1990s, their share doubled to 34%. In contrast, the proportion 
of cases opened against upper middle income and OECD countries during this period declined. 
Post Uruguay Round period did not see reversal in this pattern. As a results, the proportion of 
anti-dumping cases targeted against low and lower middle income countries increased further. 
During 1996-2000, roughly 40% of the cases were against low and middle income countries 
alone. Upper middle and OECD countries were targeted in 22.5% and 30% of the cases, 
respectively. 
 
Table 5:  Anti-dumping cases by targeted country group  
(1979-80 to 1999-2000) 
 
                (Number) 
  Number of cases 
year  1980-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-00 
Developing countries 

















































       
   Note : Parentheses show the percentage of total cases 
                                              Source: Author’s computations based on WTO Secretariat Rules division database  
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Our country level analysis of anti-dumping targets suggests that victims were more diverse than 
those victimising. In 1980, anti-dumping cases were targeted against 20 countries. The number 
of targeted countries increased to 76 by the late 1990s. This could partly be due to the break-up 
of Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia; however, mainly it shows that an increasing 
number of countries were becoming victims of anti-dumping measures (Miranda et al. 1998). In 
the low income group 10 countries were targeted in the late 1990s The corresponding figures for 
the lower middle income group, upper middle income group, OECD and non OECD groups were 
21,  18 , 9, and  7, respectively.  
 
Table 6 : Top targets in anti-dumping actions : (1996-2000) 
Country  % share in total cases  Target Rank  
OECD  
US   6.0  4 
EU  17.6  1 
Japan  4.6  6 
Upper middle  
Korea   7.6  3 
Brazil  3.1  9 
Malaysia  1.9  11 
Mexico  1.5  13 
Turkey  1.5  14 
Poland  1.3  15 
Czech Rep.  1.0  17 
Lower middle  
Russia  4.0  7 
Thailand  3.4  8 
Ukrain  2.2  10 
South Africa  1.9  12 
Romania  1.1  16 
Low income 
China  13.6  2 
India  4.0  7 
Indonesia  4.0  7 
     
Non OECD 
Taiwan  5.3  5 
Source: Author’s computations based on WTO Secretariat Rules division database 
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Table 6 suggests that the EU as a whole emerged as the most targeted region during the late 
1990s followed by China.  Individually however, China is most adversely affected country. 
Korea, US, Japan, Indonesia, India, Russia, and Thailand were other prominent targets of the 
anti-dumping tool. It is also interesting to note that East Asia and economies-in-transition were 
major victims of anti-dumping measures. During 1996-2000, nearly 50% of the total cases were 
initiated against these countries (Table 7). While Transition economies faced 26% of the total 
cases initiated, East Asian countries were not far behind with 24% of these cases.  
 
Table 7: Anti-Dumping cases targeted against economies in transition and East Asia (1979-
80 to 1999-2000)                    
 
  (Number) 
 



































   Note : Parentheses show the percentage of total cases 
  Source : Author’s computations based on WTO Secretariat Rules division database   
 
Economies in transition constitute Central and Eastern Europe, Erstwhile Soviet Union States, 
China and Vietnam. Their Non market economy status in many countries of the world is the 
decisive reason for a disproportionately high  anti-dumping cases against these countries (see 
Aggarwal 2002 for the treatment with NMEs in anti-dumping investigations). Partly causing this 
trend is the presence of transition economies in the low and middle income county groups. The 
legal provision makes the non-market economies particularly vulnerable to dumping findings 
(see Tharakan 1994 for references). The ADA allows the investigating authorities to ignore the 
nominal prices or costs in the non-market economies and base the normal value estimated on the 
price or cost of a producer of the like product in an surrogate market economy "which may be 
regarded as a substitute for the purposes of the investigation. If the surrogate market economy is   18 
highly protected/ the industry is highly concentrated/ it is at a high level of development than the 
defendant country then the constructed value is apt to be high and an affirmative finding is 
likely. In cases where the investigating country itself is the surrogate economy, finding dumping 
is almost a foregone conclusion.  Econometric results support a hypothesis about discrimination 
against transition economies at the international trade markets (Oleksiy and Shcherbakov,2001). 
The growth of anti-dumping investigations against East Asian countries  may partly be attributed 
to the Asian financial crisis that started in April 1997. As domestic demand in South East Asia 
declined sharply, they directed their production into export markets. Rapid expansion of exports 
of East Asian countries during this period might be the reason why these countries became 
prominent victims of anti-dumping.  
 
Success Rates: by targeted country group 
 
The  ratio of measures to anti-dumping cases opened by targeted country group and time period 
rate’ is presented in Table 8. It can be seen that the  proportion of anti-dumping cases contested 
successfully against low and lower middle income countries has consistently been higher than 
the average success rates. The success rate against OECD countries has always been lower than 
the overall average success rate. Clearly, low and lower middle income countries stand to loose 
in this game. 
Table 8 : Success rates  by targeted country (1980-2000) 
                                                                                     (%) 
  1980-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 
Developing countries 
Low  75.7 64.3 56.7 64.4 
Lower middle  50.0 45.3 48.6 67.2 
Upper middle  57.1 49.1 47.6 57.1 
Developed countries 
OECD  50.6 49.0 40.6 55.3 
Non OECD  61.7 38.5 36.4 62.4 
Total   53.8 48.4 46.2 60.4 
                                    Source : Author’s computations based on WTO database 
 
 
Considerable time and expense are required by a company to defend itself  against dumping 
charges (see Yano 1999). Firms from low and lower middle income countries are less equipped 
to cope up with these difficulties. Lack of expertise, lack of financial resources and lack of   19 
manpower are some of the  handicaps they face.  As a result, many firms may choose not to 
defend.  It is therefore expected that most cases contested against these countries are likely to 
result in definitive measures. There is another reason why low and lower middle income 
countries risk anti-dumping finding against them. Home market prices for domestically produced 
goods  might be higher in these countries than those in the export markets. This could be due to 
inefficient cost structure o r because of tariffs and fiscal taxes. Furthermore, most transition 
economies are in the low and lower middle income country groups. As discussed above, 
exporters from these economies are more vulnerable to affirmative findings. Therefore, the 
presence of these countries in the low and lower middle income groups could also have affected 
the success rates in these country groups.  
 
One must however note here that even if the case is terminated without measures the exporter 
has to face considerable disruption to its trade, as well as the time and expense of defending 
itself. It is often argued that anti-dumping petitions have a profound impact on imports even if 
they do not result in duties (Staiger and Wolak,1994; Prusa,2001). Imports fall dramatically 
during the investigation period regardless of the case ’s ultimate outcome. Legal scholars often 
refer to this as the ‘harassment’ effect of an anti-dumping  investigation. Using extremely 
disaggregated trade data, Prusa (2001) found that  even when an anti-dumping dispute was 
ultimately rejected, imports fell by 15-20 percent. It is therefore important to discourage the 
initiation of anti-dumping cases in the first place by making the filing conditions more stringent.  
 
Confrontation ratio : by country group   
 
We divided the number of cases initiated by each country group by the number of cases targeted 
against it. This ratio termed ‘confrontation ratio’ is presented in Table 9 broken down by time 
period. As can be seen, this ratio has always been greater than 1 for OECD countries . Clearly 
the number of cases initiated by them have been greater than the number of cases targeted 
against them in all time periods. For the upper middle income group, the ratio exceeded 1 during 
the 1990s. These were thus the least vulnerable country groups. In contrast, non OECD group 
appeared to be the most vulnerable group. It could perhaps be due to the presence of some East 
Asian economies in this group. It was followed by the low income and  lower- middle- income 
group. An over time comparison however suggests that developing countries have also been   20 
increasing confrontation over time. The number of cases initiated by them has been increasing 
faster than the number of cases targeted against them. 
 
Table 9 : Confrontation Ratio : by country group (1980-2000) 
  Ratio of anti-dumping cases initiated 
against each country-group to cases 
reported by it  
Developing countries 
Low  0  0  0.09  0.69 
Lower middle  0  0  0.36  0.92 
Upper middle  0  0.38  1.28  1.15 
Developed countries 
OECD  1.65  1.96  1.76  1.38 
Non OECD  0  0  0.11  0.18 
                                     Source : Author’s computations based on WTO Secretariat Rules division database  
 
III.3   Who targets whom : analysis by country group 
 
 
Table 10 relates initiating and targeted countries. The top row indicates countries initiating anti-
dumping cases while the first column shows  countries targeted by their investigations. During 
1980-  
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                 Note : Parentheses show the percentage of total cases                                              
                Source : Author’s computations based on WTO Secretariat Rules division database  
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2000, developing countries together launched 1286 cases, out of which around 58% were against 
other developing countries, 36% of them were against OECD countries and  the rest (6%) were 
against non OECD developed countries. Individually, the proportions of total cases launched by 
low income, lower middle income and upper middle income countries against other developing 
countries were 59%, 59% and 58% respectively. Nearly 37% of the cases initiated by low and 
lower middle income countries were against their low- and lower-middle income country 
counterparts. OECD countries, on the other hand, targeted 49% of the cases against developing 
countries and 51% against developed countries (including non OECD countries). One fourth of 
the total cases launched by OECD countries were against low and middle income countries.  
 
Thus, developing countries targeted a majority of cases against other developing countries while 
developed countries also directed a large number of investigations against these countries. 
Developing countries being the soft targets, it was not an unexpected result. Some argue that as 
long as the traditional users continue to use it against the developing countries, anti-dumping 
instrument is useful for developing countries to have the ability to hit back ( see for instance 
Vermulst 1997). However, it is a matter of concern that there have been substantial intra low- 
and lower middle income country group filings. This may be attributable in part to the fact that 
exports from countries with the same level of development compete heavily with domestic 
production in importing countries as both enjoy comparative advantages in similar lines of 
production. 
 
Table 11 investigates the patterns of anti-dumping targets by initiating country group. It shows 
that 65% of the cases directed against developing countries were initiated by OECD countries. In 
contrast, only 27% of the cases targeted against OECD countries were filed by developing 
countries. Low and lower middle income countries filed only 10% of the cases against these 
countries. Thus, OECD countries were targeted mainly by other OECD countries while 
developing countries were targeted principally by OECD countries. One could suggest that the 
rise in the cases reported by low and middle income counties in the late 1990s might be partly an 
expression of retaliation. Prusa and Skeath (2002) in an empirical study also revealed that nearly 
90% of the cases over the period 1980-98 in which traditional users (EU, Australia, US and 
Canada) were investigated were initiated by countries that had a retaliation incentives. The fact   22 
that so many anti-dumping  cases initiated by new users are motivated by retaliatory 
considerations indicates that anti-dumping may be an instrument wielded by a few countries at 
present but its use will spread in future with more and more victimised countries initiating cases 
against those victimising.  
 
Table 11 : Anti-dumping Targets: by initiating country group 1980-2000 
Targeted ﬁ 
Initiatingﬂ 
low  Lower middle  upper middle  OECD  Non OECD 
Low 55  37  44  76  18 
(8.8)  (6.6)  (4.5)  (4.5)  (5.5) 
Lower middle 61  38  64  96  20 
(9.8)  (6.8)  (6.6)  (5.7)  (6.1) 
Upper middle  156  124  172  289  36 
(25.1)  (22.1)  (17.7)  (17.1)  (11.0) 
OECD 349  361  683  1213  253 
(56.1)  (64.5)  (70.4)  (71.6)  (77.4) 
Non OECD 1  0  7  20  0 
(0.2)  (0.0)  (0.7)  (1.2)  (0.0) 
Total 622  560  970  1694  327 
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  (100) 
        
Note : Parentheses show the percentage of total cases 
      Source : Author’s computations based on WTO Secretariat Rules division database  
 
 
III.4   Anti-dumping cases by Sector 
A sectoral breakdown of global anti-dumping initiations is shown in Table 12. It is evident that 
the majority of cases were initiated in the resource intensive and science based sectors.  Within 
the resource intensive sector, base metals was the leading sector targeted. This could be due to a 
very high incidence of anti-dumping filings in the steel industry. In the science based sector, 
scale intensive - chemicals, plastic and rubber dominated anti-dumping filings over the period 
1980-2000. Why dumping cases tend to be concentrated in these sectors? Miranda et. al (1998) 
argued that ‘the world markets for  steel, base chemicals and plastics are highly cyclical. Thus, at 
the bottom  of a cycle, firms operating in these markets may turn to pricing sales below cost’ (p. 
16). It is also possible however that at the downturn, domestic firms in importing countries use 
anti-dumping law to protect themselves and since there is a very high  probability of affirmative 
injury findings during this period, they rush to file anti-dumping cases.  
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Table 12 also documents an obvious shift  away from science based sectors to resource and 
labour intensive sectors during the early 1990s.  Resource and labour sectors accounted for  less 
than 50% of the cases in the 1980s,  their share increased to roughly 60% in the 1990s. In 
contrast, the share of science based sectors declined sharply from 51% in the late 1980s to 40%. 
Even within the science based sector,  there was a sharp decline in the proportion of cases 
initiated in the differentiated sector. The share of the scale intensive sector increased sharply. 
This shift could be due to increasing participation of developing countries in anti-dumping 
mechanism both as initiating and targeted countries. 
 
 
           Table 12 : Anti-dumping cases by sector (1980-2000) 
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Note : Parentheses show the percentage of total cases 
             Source : Author’s computations based on WTO Secretariat Rules division database  
 
Anti-Dumping cases by sector and initiating country group 
 
Table 13 shows the sectoral distribution of anti-dumping  initiations within each country group 
over the period 1980-2000. Two observations may be made. First, resource intensive and science 
based sectors dominated anti-dumping  filings in all country groups.  Second, low income 
countries initiated a higher proportion of cases in science based sectors (61% of the total) than in 
resource intensive sectors (22%). Lower middle income countries reported almost the same   24 
proportion of cases in both these sectors while upper middle, OECD and non OECD developed 
countries reported a larger proportion of cases in resource intensive sectors than in science based 
sectors. These trends can be explained within the framework of the theory of comparative 
advantages. Apparently, countries used the anti-dumping  mechanism to protect the industries 
where they did not have comparative advantages. 
 
Table 13 : Sectoral distribution of Anti-dumping cases : by country group (1980-2000) 
  low  Lower 
middle 
Upper middle  OECD  Non Oecd 




























































Total  230  279  777  2859  28 
       Note : Parentheses show the percentage of total cases 




Anti-Dumping cases by sector and by targeted country group 
 
Table 14 shows the sectoral distribution of anti-dumping initiations within each targeted country 
group. In low and lower middle income countries resource and labour intensive sectors were 
targeted  most frequently.  Taken together, in developing countries these sectors were targeted in 
roughly 55 per cent to 70 per cent of the total anti-dumping cases. In developed countries (both 
OECD and non OECD), however, science based sectors were the most frequently targeted 
sectors. More than 50 per cent of the cases targeted against non OECD developed countries were 
filed in this sector alone. The frequency with which ‘differentiated sectors’ were targeted across 
different country groups was also relatively high for countries with high level of development. 
Evidently, countries were targeted in the sectors where they had comparative advantage.  
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Table 14 : Distribution of Anti-dumping cases by sector and targeted  country group (1980-
2000) 
  Low  Lower middle  Upper middle  OECD  Non OECD 






































































* Science based comprises of scale intensive and differentiated sectors; Parentheses show the            
percentage of total cases 




With these clear cut patterns emerging, it is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that anti-
dumping use signals merely an increase in unfair trade practices. This raises an obvious question 
as to what factors explain the use of the anti-dumping mechanism. In what follows we analyse 
the macroeconomic determinants of anti-dumping initiations. 
 
IV.   Empirical analysis of macroeconomic determinants of anti-dumping initiations  
 
This section is organised into 3 subsections. Section IV.1 provides the theoretical underpinning 
for the analysis and formulates hypotheses. Section IV.2 describes data and methodology and 
Section IV.3 discusses empirical results. 
 
IV.1   Motivation for Anti-dumping use: Theoretical underpinning 
 
The standard theoretical explanation for the anti-dumping use is based on the view that anti-
dumping is a response to unfair trade practice. Government-imposed home market trade barriers 
and government-tolerated anti competitive activities permit domestic producers to create   26 
monopolies in their home markets. This enables them to charge low prices in export markets and 
compensate the loss by charging higher prices in the domestic markets without attracting foreign 
entry. The anti-dumping rules are a practical response to these trade-distorting policies. From 
this perspective, dumping is always a unfair trade practice and anti-dumping is used by 
producers in the importing country to offset, quantitatively, the artificial advantages realized by 
the exporting country’s producers so that they may compete on an equal footing with the 
exporting country’s producers. Economists endorse the basic argument provided in this standard 
framework and admit that anti-dumping is a trade- corrective measure. However, they argue that 
dumping is not always a unfair trade practice nor it is harmful for the society unless it is done 
with predatory intent  (see for instance Deardorff 1993, Willig 1998, Messerlin and Tharakan 
1999, Hindley 1991, Aggarwal 2002). Prevention of predatory pricing, they argue, is the 
economic justification of anti-dumping use.  Predatory pricing is pricing designed to achieve or 
exploit monopoly power; restrict  competition in importing country and injure consumers 
through monopoly pricing in the long run. The anti-dumping law is a bulwark against such anti 
competitive practices of foreign exporters. Following the thinking in antitrust literature, 
economists view anti-dumping as a tool to promote and protect competition in international 
trade. 
 
The political economy approach (See Tharakan 1995) however argues that anti-dumping use is 
not motivated by anything other than protectionism. This argument begins with the premise that 
free trade does not bring unambiguous gains to all sections of the society.  It implies gains for 
some while loses for others. Since those who gain are not capable of compensating those who 
lose, there are protectionist pressures in the economy. Pressure groups constitute domestic 
producers in import competing industries who are likely to lose from free trade. These producers 
lobby to strive for protection. In doing so they find anti-dumping  the most potent tool of 
protection. Dumping and injury findings are almost at the discretion of the authorities. Once an 
application is made domestic firms face a high probability of obtaining protection
4. Theoretical 
                                                                 
4 Low (1993) states ‘virtually any industry that considers itself adversely affected by foreign competition and 
presents a competently assembled petition, stands a good chance demonstrating that it is under attack ‘ (p. 86). 
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and empirical literature suggests that even if no dumping is finally found, the initiation of 
investigations itself results in imports fall
5.  
 
The national authority investigates the veracity of the claims made by domestic producers and 
decides whether to initiate the case. Governments, it is argued, favour  protectionist interests 
(Caves 1976 Baldwin 1984, O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001). From the governments’ perspective, 
anti-dumping  law provides a low visibility non transparent protection tool for responding to 
protectionist demands by domestic producers. anti-dumping practices are targeted at firms not 
governments (unlike CVD) and are therefore not required to be imposed on a most-favoured 
nation basis (unlike safeguard measures). These characteristics make anti-dumping politically 
least visible contingent protection measure.  Hence the governments readily tend to support the 
use of GATT compatible anti-dumping mechanism
6.  
 
Consumers who lose from protection are marginalised in the system. The WTO agreement does 
not require a public interest test for imposing anti-dumping duty. The anti-dumping law in most 
countries does not define or elaborate on public interest and leaves the matter at the discretion of 
the authority. Even in countries which have provisions for community interest clause it has been 
observed that the clause rarely led to a decision not to impose duties in instances where dumping 
and injury was found to exist (Hoekman and Mavroidis 1996, Leclerc 1999)
7. It could be 
because consumers are less organised and less influential (Tharakan 1995). Moreover, their 
individual losses may not be great enough to induce them to organise.   
 
This school thus focuses on the factors that influence the rent seeking pressures and authorities’ 
willingness to oblige them. These could be industry specific or macroeconomic factors. 
Industrial downturn, unemployment, balance of payment pressures and trade liberalisation are 
                                                                 
5 In an econometric analysis Prusa (1999) found that imports fell on average by 15-20 per cent where investigations 
were dismissed 
6 In India, over the period  from 1992-93 to 2002-03, 175 petitions were made. The Directorate General of anti-
dumping and Allied Duties initiated investigations into 153 cases 
7 Leclerc (1999) revealed that in Canada, between 1992 and 1997 only five public interest inquiries were held but 
none of them resulted  in the tribunal reversing its initial decision to impose anti-dumping duties. In the EU, by the 
year 2000 there were two cases where the authority had concluded that  community interest did not justify the 
imposition of duty. In Australia, however there have cases where anti-dumping duties could have been imposed but 
since taking action was not in the interest of the public , exporters were given only warning   28 
some macro economic factors while the level of industrial concentration, capital intensity, profit 
rates and capacity utilisation are industry specific factors.  
 
 We analyse the use of anti-dumping within the realm of the political economy approach. While 
doing so, we focus on the effect of macro factors in influencing aggregate anti-dumping filings 
across countries. Our hypotheses are as follows. 
 
(a) Macro Economic Pressures 
Domestic macroeconomic conditions : If the macroeconomic environment is sluggish any import 
competition may put further downward pressure on the capacity utilisation, profit margins and 
employment. Besides, under such  circumstances, the probability of an affirmative material 
injury finding also increases. Domestic producers therefore lobby and pressurise the government 
to provide protection to the domestic industry. Authorities respond leniently to the emotionally 
compelling argument that foreigners are behaving unfairly, to shift focus of attention from the 
shortcoming of the domestic industry to the unfair trade practices of foreign firms. Our first 
hypothesis therefore is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Low levels of domestic activity influence the anti-dumping  use positively. 
Countries that have been undergoing  recessionary conditions file more anti-dumping cases. 
 
The model includes growth rate in industrial value addition (IVAGR) to test the above 
hypothesis. 
 
Balance of payment conditions : Import surge and adverse trade balances may independently 
influence the decisions to use anti-dumping  measures. Adverse trade balances increase the 
probability that authorities would readily accept a complaint. Though safeguard (SG) measures 
are available to meet such contingencies, their use has been highly restricted. The reasons are 
discussed in detail in the concluding part of the study. In brief one may argue that SG measures 
are applied under the recognition that the domestic industry needs to undergo adjustments while 
anti-dumping puts the blame on unfair trade practices by foreign exporters.  
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Hypothesis 2: The number of anti-dumping cases per year is related to a widening in the trade 
deficit and import surge.  
 
Two trade related variables namely, trade balance as a ratio of total trade (TRBAL ) and import 
growth rate ( Imgrth) are used in the analysis. While the former is expected to have negative 
relationship with anti-dumping filings, the latter will have positive relation ship.   
 
(b) Trade liberalisation 
 
Some trade negotiators view anti-dumping as a price paid to sustain the overall consensus in 
favor of an open trading system. They argue that the necessity of having an effective anti-
dumping remedy increases as a country liberalizes as a matter of political necessity and because 
the prospect of injurious dumping becomes real. Findings in  systematic analyses of individual 
preferences on trade and their underlying determinants based on the cross-country data set put 
together by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP),  suggest that trade patriotism and 
chauvinism are strongly related with protectionist attitude ( O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001).  Mayda 
and Rodrik (2001) reported that when asked about their views on trade, typically sixty percent or 
more of respondents in opinion polls express anti-trade views. Such preferences matter in trade 
policies as the politicians resist initiatives that are against public opinion. The use of anti-
dumping assist governments in their efforts to continue trade liberalising measures by ensuring 
relief to domestic industries in case they are injured due to import surge. Thus, when tariff rates 
are reduced authorities adopt a lenient view towards initiating anti-dumping cases. A review of 
the anti-dumping cases initiated by the EC from 1980 to 1997  (Bourgeois and Messerlin 1998) 
demonstrates that the industries most frequently involved are those that have a low MFN tariff.  
 
Hypothesis 3: anti-dumping initiations are inversely related with tariff rates. Countries lowering 
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We include average tariff rate (TARIFF) in the model to test the above hypothesis.  
 
(c) Capacity building for posing retaliation threat 
 
Some scholars argue that one of the motives for initiating  anti-dumping  cases might be 
retaliation (Finger 1981). There are several instances of retaliatory use of anti-dumping among 
developed countries (Blonigen and Bown 2003). Prusa and Skeath (2002) find evidence 
consistent with “tit-for-tat” retaliatory anti-dumping actions for both developed and developing 
countries. In general, retaliation refers to countries filing anti-dumping actions specifically  
against those countries that have named it in the past. In this study however, we argue that 
countries tend to file more anti-dumping cases if they have been subject to such investigations in 
general in the past. There is evidence (Prusa and Skeath 2002) that all new users with few 
exceptions were subject to anti-dumping investigations before they started reporting anti-
dumping cases themselves. Almost two-thirds of the new users were subject to at least 10 cases. 
Some countries,  such as Korea (40 cases) and Brazil (55 cases) were named in several cases. It 
could be that these countries felt the need for developing capability to retaliate so as to 
discourage the use of anti-dumping against them.  
 
Hypothesis 4 :  Anti-dumping filing in a country is positively related with the number of cases 
initiated against the country in the past.  
 
It is expected that the number of cases filed against a country in the past  (AFF) influence their 
decisions to initiate case in time period t.  
 
IV.2   Data and Methodology 
 
For testing the above hypotheses, we required data on anti-dumping initiations and macro 
economic variables in each country on an annual basis for the period from 1980 to 2000. We 
constructed the data set by combining the WTO data on the number of anti-dumping initiations per 
year by reporting country with the data on macro economic variables provided by the ‘World 
Bank’ in World Development Indicators CD-ROM’. We thus had a panel data set of 99 countries 
over the period 1980-2000 (21 years). For the empirical analysis, we  classified reporting   31 
developing  countries into two categories : low and middle income countries and upper income 
countries. The classification as described above was adopted from the World Bank (2000).  
 
For the empirical analysis, it was important to decide the lag structure of the regressors. 
Normally, reporting countries analyse the pricing behaviour of foriegn firms over the year prior 
to the filing of the case. This is termed investigation period (IP).  Injury is analysed over a period 
of at least three years. This period is often called the injury investigation period [IIP]. However, 
such a relatively long period is used particularly to establish causation. As a matter of practice, 
the industry must be suffering material injury during the regular investigation period (IP) and 
detailed injury margin calculations are based on the data existing during the regular investigation 
period which is one year preceding the anti-dumping application. It was therefore decided to use 
the macro economic regressors with one year lag. Tariff rate is however the rate prevailing at the 
beginning of the year.  
Our model thus is, 
 
ADINIt= f( GNPGR t-1/ IVAGR t-1,  TRBAL t-1, IMGRTH t-1/IMPENEGR t-1, TAR , AFF t-1) 
ADINIt denotes the number of anti-dumping filings in the year t. 
 
Since the dependent variable is a non-negative discrete variable, we have employed count 
models for estimation.The Poisson regression model, a non linear model, is widely used for such 
data. The distribution takes the following form. 
 
Prob(Y=y it ) = (exp (-l it )l it
y it ) / y it !      yit  = 1,2 ,3,….. 
Where,  
E(y it) =l it  and V(y it) =l it  
Typically, the poisson regression  model is given by  
log l = Xb  
 
b is estimated either by an iterative nonlinear weighted least square method or by a maximum 
likelihood method. Coefficients reported by poisson may be transformed to incidence rate ratio (   32 
the rate per unit of time at which happenings occur). The incidence rate for the observation vi  is 
assumed to be given by : 
 
vi=  e 
Xb 
 
The expected number of occurrences is equal to this incidence rate multiplied by the exposure. 
The distribution is estimated by maximum likelihood.  
 
The poisson maximum likelihood estimator is consistent and efficient provided the mean is equal 
to the variance. However, it is not uncommon to find over dispersion where the variance of 
observed counts is larger than the mean empirically. A common alternative suggested for poisson 
model in this case is the Negative binomial model which allows for over dispersion. It is derived 
by generalizing the Poisson model by introducing an individual, unobserved effect into the 
conditional mean m i  such that  
 
log m it = log l it  + log u it 
 
The non negative binomial takes the form,  
 
log m it   = x it b + e it 
 
where e  it  reflects either specification error or cross sectional heterogeneity and exp (e it ) is 
gamma distributed. The distribution of y  it conditional on xi and ui remains Poisson with 
conditional mean and variance m it : 
 
f(y it | x  it,u it ) = ((exp (-l it u it)) (lit u it )  
yit ) / y it ! 
 
The distribution has mean l and variance (l + 1/q).  
 
For statistical testing of over dispersion, we began by estimating the Poisson model. The 
goodness of fit statistics provided by the poisson model estimates however suggested that we   33 
could reject that the data were Poisson distributed at the 1% level for each model. This was due 
to over dispersion of the data. We therefore reported results based on the negative binomial 
specification. Coefficients reported by the negative binomial model may also be transformed to 
incidence rate ratio. The expected number of occurrences is equal to this incidence rate 
multiplied by the exposure . Since each observation in the data set is the number of anti-dumping 
initiations in a one year interval, the exposure in our estimation is taken to be 1. 
 
Since we have panel data with i countries over T years, it is not inappropriate to assume that 
unobserved country-specific effects exist. In order to add firm specific effects to the negative 
binomial model we could employed two methods : random effects and fixed effects. Fixed effect 
models truncated the sample by dropping observations for all those countries that never reported 
anti-dumping cases or reported them only once. We considered it appropriate to report estimates 
based on both random effects and fixed effect specifications to examine the sensitivity of our 
results to the sample and model specification.  
 
IV.3   Empirical Results 
 
Tables 15 and 16 report empirical results based on the random and fixed effect specifications. 
Equations 1&2 are based on the data from the combined low and lower middle income countries 
while equations 3 and 4 are estimated for the upper income countires. Equations 5 &6 are based 
on the data pooled for all groups of developing countries. Equations 7 &8  provide results for the 
OECD country group. Since observations in the NONOECD country groups were very small, no 
separate regression was estimated for this group.  However,  in one of the specifications 
(Equation 9), the data from both OECD and NONOECD country-groups were pooled in a single 
regression equation to estimate the results for the developed countries. Different specifications of 
the model were used to avoid multicollinearity (see the Appendix for correlation matrices). Our 
results are remarkably robust to changes in the underlying model specification and sample 
coverage. It is important to note here that the coefficients reported are ‘incidence rate ratio’ 
(IRR). If the IRR is 1.40, then a one percentage point change in the explanatory variable would 
increase counts by 40%. IRR exceeds one for the variables having positive relationship with the   34 
dependent variable; it is smaller than one ( showing decline) for the variables with negative 
signs. 
 
Our findings for the developing countries pooled in one group suggest that anti-dumping 
initiations increase substantially when there are trade balance pressures.  It is found that a one 
percentage-point decline in trade balance (TRBAL) leads to a 2%  increase in the number of anti-
dumping filing. Import growth rate has similar effects. Once we distinguish between the upper 
and low income country groups, however, we find that results differ across two groups of 
countries. For the upper income country group, IMGRTH emerges significant at 1% while 
TRBAL is insignificant. Even when IMGRTH was dropped TRBAL did not become significant. 
In low and lower middle income countries however, both trade related variables appear to have 
significant impact on anti-dumping filings. Trade related pressures therefore seem to be a major 
concern for low and lower middle income countries in using anti-dumping measures. In OECD 
countries, external pressures approximated by the international trade position (TRBAL) were 
insignificant in all specifications. Import variables IMGRTH emerged at 1 per cent in the 
presence of  IVAGR. It could also be observed that 1 percent increase in IMGRTH was 
associated with 2-3 percent increase in anti-dumping filings. However, once IVAGR is dropped 
its significance reduced considerable. Evidently, the impact of import surge becomes significant 
after controlling the effect of IVAGR. It could be that in developed countries, import competition 
is more readily accommodated when the market is expanding but producers tend to guard their 
market share when the rate of expansion slows. When economic growth is sluggish, returns  
from investing resources in seeking protection are seen to be higher than in investing in 
production activities. External pressures are shown to be unimportant for developed countries 
(Leidy 1997, Becker and Theuringer 2001). Knetter and Prusa (2003) used larger data database 
and found exchange rate appreciation to affect anti-dumping filings positively in the presence of 
the growth rate in GDP. Our results also suggest that import surge has a positive impact on anti-
dumping filings. But its weakens once the growth rate in industrial value addition is dropped. 
 
For developed countries anti-dumping initiations appear to be largely motivated by domestic 
macroeconomic pressures. Anti-dumping initiations are inversely related with the industrial 
growth all specifications for the OECD/ developed countries. A one percentage point decline in   35 
the industrial growth rate leads to a 6-7% increase in the number of anti-dumping initiations. 
This variable did  not turn out to be significant for developing countries. The existing empirical 
literature documents a significant influence of domestic macroeconomic  pressures on the use of 
anti-dumping in OECD countries (Leidy 1997 Becker and Theuringer 2001, Knetter and Prusa 
2003).  
 
Turning to the  tariff rates (TARIFF), the results indicate quite a robust negative significance for 
both developing country groups and hence for the pooled group. A one percentage point decline 
in tariff rates leads to 10-12 percent, 5 -7 percent and 8 percent increase in anti-dumping 
initiations in upper middle income, low and lower middle income countries and all developing 
countries, respectively. Results are quite expected. Till recently, companies in most developing 
countries had been operating in highly protected markets. Overprotection over a long period of 
time bred inefficiency. Therefore, the shift in favour of competition-enhancing policies in these 
countries in the 1990s, appear to have resulted in  pressures from the domestic industry to 
provide protection to be able to face international competition. Authorities also seem to adopt a 
lenient view  in granting contingent protection in order to avoid some of the adverse effects of 
liberalisation and in order to reassure domestic political interests that some form of ‘safety net’ 
remains in place.  In developed countries, TARIFF is insignificant in all specifications for 
OECD/developed countries. 
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Table 15 : Determinants of the number of anti-dumping initiations : Negative binomial 
regression random effect model 
 
  Low & middle 
income group 
countries 






OECD  All developed 
countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 


















































TRBAL   0.978 
(-1.88)
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/ln_r  -0.925  -0.929  -0.456  -0.371  -0.773  -0.364  -0.583  -0.449  -.477 
/ln_s  -2.333  -2.178  -0.249  .059  -1.555  0.036  -.531  -.483  -.571 
Loglikeliho
od 
-258.90  -270.06  -315.06  -322.95  -587.26  -320.51  -449.35  -334.41  -492.45 
Wald chi2  38.82  38.93  75.22  72.94  91.40  23.85  20.10  22.84  32.45 
No of obs  431  431  207  219  638  126  174  156  232 
a  significant at 1%, 
b  significant at 5% and 
c significant at 10%. 
 
Table 16 : Determinants of the number of anti-dumping initiations : Negative binomial 
regression fixed effect model (truncated sample) 
 
  Low & middle 
income group 
countries 





OECD  All developed 
countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
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1.075 
(4.274)

























































IMGRTH  1.017 
(1.603)
  





































-188.85  -270.06  -250.46  -251.48  -453.26  -263.51  -386.58  -269.39  -417.45 
Wald chi2  64.40  38.93  70.80  72.39  136.40  20.59  18.10  20.84  28.45 
No of obs  149  157  169  169  318  109  143  130  183 
a  significant at 1%, 
b  significant at 5% and 
c significant at 10%. 
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Finally, our results support the capacity creation hypothesis for the anti-dumping initiations in 
developing countries. AFF is significant at  1 % significance level in all specification for the 
developing  country groups. For low and lower middle income countries this seems to be the 
most important variable resulting in 14-16 per cent increase in anti-dumping initiations with 
every one percent increase in anti-dumping cases reported against them. The results are less 
pronounced for upper  middle income countries while for OECD (developed) countries, it is 
insignificant in all equations. Prusa and Skeath (2002) carried out  non parametric tests and 
observed that new users’ (mainly developing countries) anti-dumping initiations are more often 
consistent with the retaliation motive than those of traditional users. Apparently, the use of anti-
dumping measures against developing countries motivates them to use similar policies against 
other countries. This helps them in creating capacity to use these measures and pose retaliations 
threats that may dampen such activity against them. In an important study Blonigen and Bown 
(2003) have argued that the capacity to retaliate may have dampening effects on anti-dumping 
activities of trading partners. Perhaps the use of anti-dumping helps them in acquiring anti-
dumping capabilities and  posing retaliation threat to counter such activities against them . One 
may thus suggest that increased anti-dumping familiarity and  ability across developing countries 
may ultimately help put the brakes on anti-dumping use by traditional users. However, this may 
also result in anti-dumping wars reversing trade liberalisation gains. This may therefore prove to 
be a  costly strategy to restrain the anti-dumping use.  
 
V   Conclusion and Policy implications 
 
Anti-dumping emerged as a global phenomenon in the past decade and is now used extensively by 
developed and developing countries alike. This study shows that the total number of cases being 
opened throughout the world is increasing rapidly.  Moreover, there has been a significant 
change in the patterns of anti-dumping activity over the period of past 20 years. Our study shows a 
massive shift away from developed to developing countries. In the 1990s, the surge in anti-
dumping cases was fuelled by  developing countries when the number of anti-dumping cases sharply 
increased among all categories of these countries. T he number of cases targeted against 
developing countries also increased sharply in the 1990s. In fact the number of cases initiated 
against low and lower middle income countries increased faster than the number of cases   38 
initiated by them. Transition economies and East Asian countries were found to be worst hit by 
anti-dumping use. This is the natural outcome of the legal provisions that make the non-market 
economies more vulnerable to dumping findings. It was also observed that there was a distinct 
rise in the success rates of anti-dumping initiations during the late 1990s  in all country-groups. 
Evidence suggests that low and middle income developing countries were targeted mainly by 
OECD countries while they themselves were targeting other developing countries.  Analysis of 
sectoral patterns of anti-dumping initiations suggests that a majority of cases were initiated  in 
resource intensive and science based sectors. Base metals was the leading resource intensive 
sector targeted. This could be due to a very high incidence of anti-dumping filings in the steel 
industry. In the science based sector, scale intensive - chemicals, plastic and rubber dominated 
anti-dumping filings over the period 1980-2000. The study also observes  that countries were 
targeted primarily in the sectors where they had comparative advantage and they tended to use 
this mechanism primarily in the sectors where they did not have comparative advantage.  With 
these clearcut patterns emerging , it is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that anti-dumping is 
a trade correcting tool. This study  found that the use of anti-dumping measures is significantly 
explained by macro variables. In developed countries, anti-dumping is primarily used as an import-
deterrent device during business downswing. It appears that when on the upturn of business 
cycles firms in these countries are not significantly concerned with import competition. However 
when on the downswing they strive for anti-dumping protection from import competition.  In 
developing countries that are evolving from a controlled to a more liberal trading regime, anti-
dumping appears to serve as a tool in enabling governments to open up their economies. The rise 
in the number of anti-dumping initiations by developing countries may partly be an expression of 
retaliation. U sing the anti-dumping law enables them to create ability to counter such actions 
targeted against them. External pressures such as import penetration and balance of payment 
deficits also exert considerable influence on the use of anti-dumping in these countries. 
 
Empirical evidence presented in the study has important implications. First, it reinforces the view 
that the primary jurisdiction for the anti-dumping law is really more political  than economic. 
Clearly, anti-dumping measures have gone beyond punishing unfair trade practices and creating a 
level playing field as claimed by the national anti-dumping authorities. These have been used to 
protect the domestic industry. Even though the GATT designed safeguard protection also, it does   39 
not have the AD’s unique combination of  economic and political manipulability. The use of anti-
dumping is fraught with several ambiguities and is amenable to misuse, which makes anti-dumping 
duty highly discriminatory in nature. Once the anti-dumping case is filed the decision to grant 
protection is subject to substantial discretion and hence can be influenced by the involved 
parties. On the other hand, the use of  SG is permitted when there is an import surge or increase 
in the imports’ share of  a shrinking market which threatens serious injury to domestic producers. 
Thus the use of this tool is not based on the proof of unfair trade practices by foreign firms. The 
key issue is whether the local economy is subject injury due to trade shock. The ‘morality of 
foreigners is irrelevant. It does not require evidence to blame foreigners for the unfairness. In this 
sense, it is the least ambiguous measure of contingent protection. Aside from this, anti-dumping 
measures are firm specific. In contrast, s afeguard  conforms to the principle of non-
discrimination. It is non-discriminatory i.e. safeguard shall be applied t o a product being 
imported irrespective of its source. It can not be targeted at imports from a particular country. In 
the case of safeguard measures  thus government acts against other countries. It is therefore clear 
that SG measures have greater political visibility than the anti dumping. Besides,   a member 
proposing to apply/extend safeguard measure is expected to provide adequate opportunity for 
prior consultation with those members having a substantial interest as exporters of the product 
concerned with a view to review information provided by the member country. However, there 
are no such provisions for consultation in the case of anti dumping law.  Finally,  the safeguard 
agreement provide for differential and preferential treatment of developing countries. Safeguard 
measure may be taken against a developing country only if it supplies more than three percent of 
imports of that product. In case these countries supply less than 3 percent individually, they 
should together account for more than 9 percent of total imports to be subject to the safeguard 
measures. Furthermore, a developing country has the right to extend the period of application of 
a safeguard measure for a period upto two years beyond the maximum period.  Finally, 
notwithstanding the provisions of the paragraph 5 of Article 7, a developing country may apply 
SG measures again to the import of  a product which has been subject to such a measure , 
provided that the period of non-application is at least two years. No such preferential treatment is 
provided to developing countries in the anti-dumping law. Article 15 of the law recognises that 
special regard must be given by developed countries to developing countries but it is not 
effective. For these reasons anti-dumping is a unique combination of WTO consistency and ease of   40 
use and safeguard measures are no competitors to anti dumping. And this is perhaps the reason 
why anti-dumping measures are frequently used as trade protectionist measures.  
 
Second,  our findings suggest that once the WTO is fully enforced, the use of anti-dumping will 
spread among developing countries not only due to greater liberalisation pressures but also due 
to the fact that more and more countries would like to create anti-dumping ability to counter the 
anti-dumping u se against them. This may  have chain effect on the use of anti-dumping and may 
reverse the trade gains that liberalisation may ensure to developing countries. It is therefore 
important to retrain the use of anti-dumping against developing countries. WTO records show that 
around 63% of the cases initiated during 1995-200 were directed against the developing 
countries. An analysis of the number of anti-dumping duties, currently in force in the US and the 
EU against developed and developing countries, yields startling revelations. In the US, two-
thirds of the anti-dumping duties are imposed against the developing countries while in the EU  
around 90% of all impositions are against these countries. OECD countries should therefore take 
lead in restricting the use of anti-dumping against developing countries. This paper thus calls for 
granting special and differential (S&D) treatment to developing countries in this provision. By 
restraining the anti-dumping use against developing countries, developed countries will help in 
controlling the further spread in anti-dumping use. And this  will benefit the developed and the 
developing countries, both.  
 
Third implication that may be drawn is that anti-dumping has no real antitrust analogue. It is a 
protection measure and is affected by the same set of factors that determine  the use of safeguard 
measures. If both safeguard and anti-dumping measures aim at providing protection to domestic 
firms, then there is no rationale for having two different mechanisms dealing with the same 
situation. In fact, much of the contingent protection that is handled under anti-dumping law could 
have been dealt with under safeguard measures. SG measures are not popular because they are 
less attractive. They are subject to more stringent conditions in terms of prerequisites and 
compensation than anti-dumping (Roitinger 2002).  The use of safeguard  comes along with 
compensation because these are applied under the recognition that the domestic industry needs to 
undergo  adjustments. Anti-dumping requires  no compensation since it is allegedly based on 
unfair trade. Moreover, prerequisite for initiating SG measures are higher in comparison with   41 
AD. SG are applied if imports enter the country in such increased quantities, absolute or relative 
as to cause/threaten serious injury to the domestic industry.  Anti-dumping is restricted to 
dumping that causes/ threaten material injury. Furthermore, safeguard measures are non 
discriminatory while anti-dumping is firm and country specific. Finally, the investigation process 
of anti-dumping itself tends to hamper exports. However, economists, while assessing the costs 
and benefits of contingent protection measures argue that safeguard measures are superior to 
Anti-dumping. They suggest that an open trading system  can best be maintained when the 
protection costs arising from the use of such measures are kept within national boundaries 
(Tavares 1995) and safeguard measures offer countries this possibility of keeping protection 
costs within national boundaries. Besides, safeguards are more transparent, less belligerent and 
more focussed than anti-dumping. Therefore, one may argue that future negotiations should 
therefore be directed at revising SG rules and replacing anti-dumping by this new clause. 
However,  the decision of the Ministerial Conference of the WTO at Doha emphasises the 
preservation of the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of this agreement, its instruments 
and its objectives. This study nevertheless argues that further fine-tuning and refining of the anti-
dumping policy is not the answer to prevent its (mis)use. Anti-dumping law is fundamentally 
flawed and it is difficult to define general policy guidelines that would make anti-dumping more 
rational within the existing framework. 
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Table A1: List of variables  
Variable  Description 
TARIFF  Average Tariff rate  
IMGRTH  Growth rate of imports in period t-1 
IVAGR  Growth rate of Industrial value addition in period t-1 
AFF  No. of cases initiated against a country in period t-1 
TRBAL  Difference in exports and imports in period t-1 
 
 
Table A2: List of countries included in the analysis 
 
Low and Middle income countries 
Armenia Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, China, P.R., Côte d'Ivoire, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyz Rep., 
Malawi, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Algeria, 
Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,   46 
Georgia, Guatemala, Iran, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Serbia, South Africa 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia. 
Upper income 
Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Korea, Rep. Of, 
Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey 
Uruguay, Venezuela. 
OECD 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, European Community, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Non OECD Developed 




Table A3: List of Sectors 
 
Sectors   
Resource Intensive  Live Animals, Animal Products, vegetable 
products, Animal or Vegetable Fats &Oils, 
Tobacco & Mfd. Tobacco Products, Mineral 
Products, Raw hides & skins, Wood &Articles 
of Wood, Articles of stone, plaster,cement or 
similar, Base Metals& Articles of Base 
Materials 
Labour intensive  Textile Articles Footwear, Headgear & the 








Machinery & Mechanical Appliances, 
Vehicles, Aircraft & associated Transport 
 
Products Of Chemical or Allied Industries 
Plastics & Articles, Rubber & Articles 
Optical,Photographic &accessories thereof 
Miscellaneous  Arms and ammunition, Works of art,collectors' 
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Table A4 : Correlation Matrices 
 
LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRY_GROUPS 
  TARIFF  IMGRTH  IVAGR  AFF  TRBAL 
TARIFF  1         
IMGRTH  0.0671  1       
IVAGR  0.1768  0.3615  1     
AFF  -0.1495  0.0713  0.1688  1   
TRBAL  -0.1369  -0.1257  0.0476  0.1767  1 
UPPER INCOME GROUP 
TARIFF  1         
IMGRTH  -0.054  1       
IVAGR  0.2289  0.4491  1     
AFF  -0.0889  -0.0102  0.1698  1   
TRBAL  0.2207  -0.2777  -0.2406  0.1033  1 
OECD 
TARIFF  1         
IMGRTH  0.0297  1       
IVAGR  0.0837  0.4962  1     
AFF  -0.0044  -0.1182  0  1   
TRBAL  -0.1318  -0.0648  0.1144  0.1992  1 
 